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Introduction
Over the recent years, the involvement of women in corruption scan-dals, both as officials and as wives or mistresses of corrupt male of-
ficials, has attracted the spotlight of media coverage. In September 2012, 
just prior to the opening of the 18th Communist Party of China Congress 
in Beijing, Bo Xilai, the former party chief of Chongqing, was sacked due 
to, among other things, corruption. His wife Gu Kailai received a  sus-
pended death sentence for having killed a British businessman by  poi-
soning. (Huffington Post, 2012). Early in January 2013, a  high official 
named Yi Junqing was stripped of his office after one of his mistresses had 
exposed their affair on a blog. Yi, the Director of the Central Compilation 
and Translation Bureau of the  CCP Central Committee, was removed 
under the charge of “improper life style”. (Women of China, 2013). How-
ever, he is not alone. The Guardian reports, “a blog post on 30 December 
accused the party secretary of an impoverished county in Yunnan province 
of purchasing 10 SUVs and getting drunk with a group of attractive wom-
en”; “the vice-mayor of a small city in Guangdong province lost his job 
after a subordinate exposed his connection to a local drug ring. Blog posts 
accuse the deputy chief of the province’s Land Resource Bureau of having 
affairs with 47 mistresses and receiving almost £2.8bn in bribes”; and 
“Chinese media have accused the twenty-something daughter of a former 
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housing official in Zhengzhou, capital of central Henan province, of own-
ing 11 flats. Her 27-year-old brother may own as many as 14. Her family is 
under investigation”. (The Guardian, 2013). The Times of India cited a re-
cent report by Renmin University in China, saying that “about 95 per cent 
of officials being investigated have mistresses”. (Times of India, 2013).
Contrary to the salient and frequent exposure of women in corruption 
in the media, scholarly research on corruption in China, international-
ly as well as domestically, has up to today rendered women, and hence 
the question of gender, to little relevance. Generic corruption studies at-
tempt to “answer all the questions that pertain to the phenomenon: why 
does it happen (causes); how does it happen (patterns, forms); what effects 
does it have (consequences, impacts); and how to control it (solutions, 
remedies)” (Lü, 2000: 3). While recognizing that corruption “has spread 
since the reform period” (Rooij, 2005: 293), the latest studies of corrup-
tion in China mainly “try to determine the origin of this development” 
(ibid.). According to these studies, the cause of corruption spreading in 
reform China is identified as: 1. the  development of market economy, 
specifically the dual price mechanism and the influx of foreign investment 
that “created graft opportunities” (ibid.); 2. the “relatively slow increase 
in public officials’ incomes”; 3. the “weak regulatory system that allows 
corruption to grow”; 4. the “incomplete political reform that resulted in 
a lack of checks and balances”; 5. the “lack of ethics against corruption due 
to the changes in ideology” and “the lack of ‘commercial morality in eco-
nomic life’” (Rooij, 2005: 294). Not only is the word “gender” completely 
missing from these studies, but also the question of whether corruption 
is a gendered problem remains under investigated and hence unanswered. 
The contrast between women in corruption as a very hot topic in the Chi-
nese (as well as overseas) media and the salience in academia leaves us 
some important questions:
Is corruption a gendered problem in China? Does gender have any 
implications for corruption? If so, does the role or behavior of men and 
women differ when it comes to power abuse and corruption? Are women 
cleaner or more honest than men? Are male government officials more 
susceptible to corruption than female officials? Or which sex in China 
can be more counted upon than the other as the reliable combatant in 
the fight against corruption? In this paper, we attempt to bring “gender” in 
by asking and exploring the relevance of gender in corruption and in under-
standing the very nature of the corruption problem. Our aim is to bridge 
13Gender and Corruption – insights from China
the gap between gender-women-focused media coverage of corruption and 
the complete ignorance of gender in academic research on corruption in 
China. In order to do so, we will in the following divide the paper into 
three sections. Section one engages in a theoretical discussion on the role 
of women in corruption. We introduce a bouquet of theories and delib-
erate on the relevance of these theories in explaining and understanding 
the role of gender in corruption in China. Section two presents an array of 
empirical evidence from China and a look into the involvement of women 
in corruption as government officials; wives, daughters, family members 
of male officials; and as mistresses of government officials. Section three 
summarizes our findings and theoretical reflections on the role of gender 
in corruption and anti-corruption based on the empirics from China.
Theories of Gender and Corruption
Theories of gender and corruption in general can be divided into two 
camps: one can be termed as the “idealistic” camp and the other the “re-
alistic” camp. The  idealistic camp views women as the more ethic and 
greater responsibility-sensed sex and hence less corrupt, or less tolerant to 
corruption behavior (Swamyet al.2001; Dollar et al. 2001). Studies in this 
camp shows that “women are less involved in bribery, and are less likely 
to condone bribe-taking”, and “corruption is less severe where women 
hold a large share of parliament seats and senior positions in the govern-
ment, bureaucracy, and comprise a larger share of the labor force” (Swamy 
et al.2001: 25). The study by Dollar et al. also “finds a very high level of 
raw correlation between low corruption scores and relatively high num-
bers of women in parliaments” (Goetz, 2007: 93), indicating that “women 
may have higher standards of ethical behavior and be more concerned 
with the  common good” (Dollar et al. 2001: 427). This view has also 
a  clear reflection in the  2001 report by  the  World Bank, “Engendering 
Development through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice”. 
The  report found that “societies where women have greater rights and 
participate more in public life… have cleaner business and governments 
and enjoy more productive economies” (quoted from Sung, 2006: 139).
The realistic camp sees the perception of women as the “fairer and 
cleaner” sex as a myth and is highly skeptical towards the assumed cor-
ruption-reducing effect of women and their probity. A  study by  Esarey 
and Chirillo finds “evidence that the  relationship between gender and 
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corruptiondiffers by  institutional context. Where corruption is stigma-
tized, women will be less tolerant of corruption and less likely to partic-
ipate compared to men. But if ‘corrupt’ behaviors are an ordinary part of 
governance supported by political institutions, there will be no corrup-
tion gender gap” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2012: 24). Alhassan-Alolo’s article 
concludes that “women may not prove less corrupt in the public sector 
if corrupt opportunities and networks are not restrained. Also, the very 
gender system, which is used to justify women’s proclivity to less corrupt 
behavior and subsequent integration into the public sector, could itself be 
the source of corruption as women attempt to fulfill their gender roles” 
(Alhassan-Alolo, 2007: 227). According to Sung, “Control over resources 
and influence makes corruption possible and attractive”, and “in theory, 
the redistribution of political power trigged by the political emancipation 
of women should not change the general prevalence of corrupt incidents 
because the overall levels of motivation and opportunities for corruption 
remain the same”. Sung even forecasts that “an increase in the propor-
tion of appointed and elected female officials in government should in-
crease the number of corrupt female officials and simultaneously decrease 
the number of corrupt male officials” (Sung, 2006: 140).
The evidence we collected from China shows that women do partici-
pate in corruption, if not in equally big statistic numbers, then at least in 
a very identical manner and behavioral patterns. These pieces of evidence 
attest the  corruptibility of female power holders and contradict the  as-
sumption of women being the “cleaner and fairer” sex in politics. When 
conditions and opportunities are equally present and control or moni-
toring are equally lacking, women in power do seek private interests and 
personal gains by manipulating the power that the public has invested in 
their hands in a similar manner to me. Additionally, women in the vicin-
ity of power do seek the maximization of their economic and career-wise 
benefits either through familial relations or by sex-power exchange. Thus, 
although China is a country with a high rate of participation by women 
in public life, as the 2001 World Bank report described, the prospect of 
a clean government is nevertheless far away on the horizon. The “more 
women, the  lesser corruption” correlation seems to be an illusion, not 
a reality.
Whether women are clean or not, we need theories to shed a  light 
on the various mechanisms that drive one into corruptive behaviors. In 
other words, we need to explain why the corruptibility of women is not 
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necessarily lesser than men and why the behavioral difference of gender in 
corruption is not as striking as the idealistic camp has suggested. These 
theories of explanation can be identified at two levels:
At the contextual level, we found theories of transition economics rel-
evant to our understanding of why corruption occurs on such a big scale as 
it is in reform China and why it involves both men and women. Accord-
ing to these theories, the transition to a market economy has altered both 
the goal of life and the degree of social and political control, fashioning 
a new overall context for living and social mobility. Zhang states, “When 
Chinese Communists worshiped the ‘social poor’, the social constraints 
were relatively strong, opportunities were relatively low, and motivations 
were relatively weak for bribery and corruption. However, as China has 
been transforming to a market economy with the tenet of “getting rich is 
glorious”, official power is becoming a major means for “poor” officials 
to achieve the goals of getting rich as the old measure of political control 
lose their power. The flourishing bribery and corruption among officials 
are a reflection of this ‘social anomic’” (Zhang, in Liu et al. 2001: 33–34). 
Iwasaki and Suzuki also point out that “corruption began to take place 
more for self-interest than as socially necessary evil in the former socialist 
states… in the process of systematic transformation to a capitalist market 
economy”. Corruption “has become more widespread in the  transition 
economies” (Iwasaki and Suzuki, 2012: 54).
At the  institutional or cultural level we found theories postulating 
the  unlikeliness of a  notable gender gap in corruption when corrupt 
beha viors “are an ordinary part of governance supported by political in-
stitutions” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2012: 24); when ‘collective graft’ and ‘or-
ganizational corruption’ is widespread (Lü, 2000; Ngo, 2008;); and when 
social culture ties importance to “personal networks, reciprocity, and gift 
giving” (Rooij, 2005: 294). Specifically, we found three theories that illu-
minate the impact of institutionalized corruption culture and praxis on 
individuals. One is the DAO theory, which stems from the field of crim-
inology and is used to explain “the process through which an individual 
comes to engage in criminal behavior”. It argues that “opportunities and 
networks of criminal behavior are critical determinants of an individu-
al’s engagement in a criminal action. In other words, people who commit 
crime not only have frequent interaction with those who condone such 
behavior, but also have the opportunity to do so” (Sutherland and Cressey, 
1977: 77–79, quoted from (Alhassan-Alolo, 2007: 229). One is the social 
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role theory, according to which “an individual’s (public servant) behavior 
is influenced by: (a) the individual’s cognition of an appropriate behavior 
for a person occupying his/her position; (b) the individual’s perceptions of 
expectations that others hold for him/her as an occupant of a given role; 
(c) the individual’s perceived role pressures-fears of sanctions if she/he de-
viates from the expectations” (Price, 1975, quoted from (Alhassan-Alolo, 
2007: 229). Then there is the gender role theory, which shows that when 
women go along with corruption, it may because women “feel greater pres-
sure to conform to existing norms about corruption” (Esarey and Chirillo, 
2012: 2). They are “more averse to the risks of violating political norms”, 
as “gender discrimination makes violating institutional norms a  riskier 
proposition for women than men” (Esarey and Chirillo, 2012: 24).
Although these theories offer a reasonably convincing explanation for 
why women can go corrupt, their primary focus is on the large outer envi-
ronment and the impact that this environment has on female individuals. 
We argue that in order to give a fuller account of the role in corruption 
that we have, we need a theory at the individual level to help us to catch 
the “agency” aspect of corruption and understand the choice of individ-
uals. In other words, we decline to view the participation of females in 
corruption as merely a  result of passive exposure to a corrupt environ-
ment and the gradual erosion of the moral nobility of an individual by this 
environment. Our concern is what makes an individual woman to engage 
in corruption while the  consequence of corruption is obviously severe? 
What does corruption mean to her and what goal will she achieve through 
engaging in corruptive activities?
In this study we propose the theory of chaotic capital/resource acqui-
sitionto shed a light on the link between a corruptive environment and 
the active choice of the corrupted individuals. By “chaotic capital/resource 
acquisition” we mean the almost anarchical state of resource flow towards 
the rich, male or powerful end and the lack of effective control over the re-
source distribution in society. The implication of this theory is two-fold. 
For female government officials, corruption might be the only chance for 
them to redirect the flow of economic resources (usually into the pocket 
of powerful males) and get their share of the “cake”. For women in gen-
eral, gender discrimination and the  sexualization of women on the  job 
market obstructs their opportunity to equally advance along the  career 
ladder with men. This diverts them to focus on individual-based strate-
gies, and with the utilization of female sexual power they might be able to 
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attain huge economic gains that they normally would not be able to get on 
the job market. To align with a corrupt male official provides a short cut 
to a comfortable and respectable material life.
Here we bring in the theory of sexual capital to shed further light on 
the nexus of power-sex-money exchange. Sexual capital “refers to a per-
son’s resources, competencies and endowments that provide status as 
sexual agents within a field” (Farrer, 2010: 75). According to Davis, “sex-
ual attractiveness”, as a  value, “can be traded for economic and social 
advantage” (Davis, 1966: 324). In a pairing system, it “tends to involve 
an exchange of female attractiveness for male money” due to the fact that 
“men have greater economic resources than women” (Martin, 2006: 110). 
The convertibility between social, economic status and sexual attractive-
ness, though also existing during the socialist period, becomes much more 
open, effective and widespread in reformed China. The development of 
a market economy, combined with a sexual revolution (Farrer, 2006; Ev-
ans, 1997; Pan, 1993, 1995; Li  2003a, 2003b) has capitalized sex and 
sexual attractiveness, making sex and sexual pleasure a commodity that 
has a price and can be traded (Yue, 2004). At the same time, the sexual 
competence and buying power of men has been greatly strengthened due 
to the  rapid accumulation and concentration of economic and political 
resources in their hands. Government officials, through the acceptance of 
bribes, rent-seeking, embezzlement and other corruption activities, have 
become a new rich and hence powerful buyer on the sex market. They add 
to the already visible wealthy businessmen and cultural elite, prosperous 
and exotic foreigners as well as overseas Chinese citizens (Farrer, 2010).
The Participation in Corruption by Women in China
In the  following, we shall look into the  cases of corruption involv-
ing women. Two questions of clarification before we proceed. One, due 
to the  space limit, we allow ourselves to evade a detailed discussion of 
the  “corruption” concept. Corruption, in this paper, refers to the  mis-
deeds that either have been deemed or generally are deemed as corruption, 
involving typically the “misuse of public authority for private interests” 
(Rooij, 2005: 292). Two, this study is based on actual corruption cases, 
not on cross-national corruption statistics. As so, it is not our intension 
to discuss the exact sexual ratio of corruption in statistic terms. As a mat-
ter of fact, such statistics are hard to find in China. Common sense tells 
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one that far more male officials than female officials have been caught for 
corruption, though we may caution against the conclusion that men are 
more corruptible than women since the higher occurrence of corruption 
among male officials may be attributed to the fact that far more men than 
women are found in politics and powerful positions. In the following, we 
provide evidence of participation by women, direct or indirect, in corrup-
tion as government officials, wives, daughters and family members, and as 
mistresses of male government officials.
The participation of women in corruption 
as government officials
Corruption existed in the Maoist era. In the reform era, however, both 
the “forms, extent and characteristics of corruption have changed great-
ly…” (Dai, 2010: 59). Over the past thirty years or more, several tens of 
thousands of corruption cases are prosecuted on a yearly basis, a testimo-
ny of the scale and gravity of the. The number of prosecuted corruption 
cases in 1999, 2000and2001, for example, is respectively 38,382, 45,113 
and 36,447, involving respectively 2,200, 2,680 and 2,670 government 
officials at the county-level and above (See Rooij, 2005: 304). Since these 
figures are not gender-divided, it is impossible to detect the gender ratio 
and balance in these corruption cases. The general feeling is that the over-
whelming majority of these crime cases are committed by male officials.
But female officials have also begun to catch the headline of media 
reports and arouse public sensations in corruption scandals over the re-
cent years. The following list contains the names of the 17 female offi-
cials who were convicted and prosecuted for corruption since 2000: Zhang 
Meifang (张美芳). Zhao Wenjuan (赵文娟), Li Qihong (李启红), Shang jun 
(尚军), Yang Xiuzhu (杨秀珠), LuoYaping (罗亚平), Jiang Yanping (蒋艳萍), 
An Huijun (安惠君), Han Guizhi (韩桂芝), Liu Guangming (刘光明), Zhao 
Shunyi (赵顺义), Jin Hong (靳红), Zhang Guaiping (张改萍), Lao Derong 
(劳德容), Gu Huijuan (顾慧娟) and Dong Jinting (董金亭). In his study 
of corruption in contemporary China, Dai categorizes the  main forms 
of corruption in China that not only share “the primary characteristics 
of corruption in other countries”, but also characterize the “transitional 
Chinese style that reflects its different social, cultural and political back-
ground” (Dai, 2010: 61). These include: 1. “‘No.  1 leader corruption’” 
(meaning the main responsible person in a party committee or a govern-
19Gender and Corruption – insights from China
ment); 2. “Personnel Management Corruption”, that is, cash for jobs; 
3. “Public Project Corruption”; 4. “Examining and Approval Power Cor-
ruption”; and 5. “Collective Practiced Bribery Corruption” (ibid.). We then 
found an evident manifestation of all of these forms of power misusage in 
the corruption cases against these female officials. First of all, they all oc-
cupy a powerful position within the system of their jurisdiction and are ei-
ther major decision-makers or gateway keepers. Within these cases, 11 of 
them were in “chief” positions (the number 1 leader) while the remaining 
6 were in “deputy” (secondary) positions. People in these positions have 
often concentrated and unconstrained power due the  (still) lack of checks 
and balances as well as transparency in the decision-making process, and 
the corruption behavior is often a result of the self-indulgence of the pow-
er-holder in this kind of concentrated and unconstrained power. One of 
the women convicted for corruption, Lao Derong, formerly the number 
1 leader of the Energy Group in Shenzhen, confessed that her transmu-
tation into corruption was probably due to the fact that she was in a too 
powerful position that allowed overly concentrated power in her hands.
We then divide these women into four sub-categories according to 
their job content in order to show what kind of power they have in specific 
and how this power became a source of corruption and abuse. As indicat-
ed by the following table, five of them reside in the number 1 position in 
either government financial or accounting departments at different levels, 
having both direct access to public funds and supreme power over man-
aging public funds. The major form of corruption they committed was 
embezzlement. Two of them were former heads of a  local government 
department dealing with land resources and urban infrastructure devel-
opment. They typically committed typically “public project corruption” 
form of corruption by taking bribes from land and public project contrac-
tors, so the power regarding and use and the distribution of public projects 
became a  source for their personal economic gains. The  remaining ten 
women were heads or deputy heads of a party or government institutions, 
as well as directors of large state-owned enterprises. They held all-round 
power and influence on basically every aspect of their organization, and 
hence committed various kinds of corruption of, such as “No.1 leader 
corruption”, “Personnel Management Corruption”, “Examining and Ap-
proval Power Corruption” and “Collective Practiced Bribery Corruption”. 
Han Guizhi, former Deputy Secretary of the  Heilongjiang Provincial 
Party Committee and Chairman of the Heilongjiang Provincial Political 
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Consultative Congress, for instance, traded her personnel management of 
power for money, offering positions and promotions to lesser officials in 
return for payments and gifts. It is important to note that her case is not 
a rare one. Some of the lesser officials who had bribed her for a promotion 
also ‘sold’ governmental positions within their jurisdiction once they were 
promoted by virtue of bribery.
Table 1. Corruption by Power Category
Type of power Number Proportion
Financial and accounting 5 29.0%
Manager of state-owned companies 2 11.5%
Chief/deputy party-government head 8 48.0%
Head of government dealing with land 
and infrastructure building
2 11.5%
Source:  http://slide.book.sina.com.cn/slide_14_651_28784.html#p=1  (accessed 
16.05.2013).
Though unrepresentative statistically, this small bouquet of examples 
involving female corruption contain all the essential elements featuring 
corruption among party government officials in present-day China. We 
found no specific gender difference in corruption behavior when the condi-
tions and convenience for corruption are present. In other words, whether 
an official is male or female makes no difference in corruption behav-
ior, though power certainly does. One central ingredient of corruption is 
the trade of power for money, be it embezzlement, bribery or bribe-tak-
ing. All the recent major corruption cases in China have demonstrated 
the corruptive power of unconstrained power, no matter whether or not 
the power holder is a man or a woman. To the extent that corruption rests 
upon power and connection, the presence of women in major corruption 
cases implies that these women have risen to truly powerful positions 
and that they have got a firm foothold within the nexus of connection and 
‘guanxi’ relations. The statistical dominance of male bureaucrats in cor-
ruption cases in China, thus, may not be taken as the testimony of higher 
male corruptibility than female; rather, it is an indication of (still) male 
dominance of power and powerful positions.
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Female participation in corruption as mistresses
While gender is insignificant in corruption behavior, it is signifi-
cant in explaining the  emergence of a distinctive pattern of corruption 
in reform China, namely the threefold exchange between power, money 
and sex. Almost all the reported corruption cases involve these three el-
ements. Dishonest officials collect money through trading their power. 
They in turn spend the money lavishly to satisfy their ego and feed their 
self-pride. Apart from material and recreational goods, (extramarital) sex 
has become a new sought-after commodity (Wang, 2005;Ding 2000; Liu 
2003). With power, fame and money in their hands, dishonest officials 
plunge themselves into the newly risen sex market and find various ways 
to ‘consume’ female bodies (Li, 2012). Some visit brothels, use call girls 
or even collect prostitutes from the street. Some take advantage of the fe-
male employees in the vicinity. However, the majority practices de facto 
polygamy by taking up one or several young and beautiful women as their 
mistresses. In a way, young and beautiful women have become a new ac-
cessory and hence a  status symbol for powerful men (Ding 2000; Liu 
2003; Li, 2012). The Times of India cites a recent report by the Renmin 
University of China saying that “about 95 per cent of officials being in-
vestigated have mistresses”. According to the Guardian, the Deputy Chief 
of the Land Resource Bureau in Guangdong Province was accused by blog 
posts for receiving almost £2.8bn in bribes and for having affairs with 
47 mistresses! (The Guardian, 2013). Taking into account of the gener-
al “sexual opening up” and “romantic revolution” that has swept Chi-
na since the reform began (Farrer, 2006; Evans, 1997; Pan, 1993, 1995; 
Li  2003), mistress culture and promiscuous sexual behavior itself may 
not necessarily constitute a corruptive act. However, to the extent that 
corruption scandals and sexual scandals have become symbiotic, we need 
to look into the widespread mistress culture among Chinese officials in 
order to untangle the  interplay between power, money and sex as well 
as the role of gender and gender relations in corruptions. The first ques-
tion concerns the “economic capital” of male officials and their endeavor 
to enhance their economic capital. In the  “liberated” sex market (also 
pairing practice) in reform China, economic status becomes the greatest 
leverage for a male than anything else and this has differentiated their 
access and affordability to sexual pleasures outside of home. While mid-
dle-aged business men from Hong Kong and Taiwan discovered their great 
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“purchasing” power on the sexual market in Mainland China and began 
to enjoy life with the mistresses they contracted for long or short terms 
(Yue, 2004), white foreigners have also an advantage in attracting young 
Chinese young and in engaging in interracial sexual adventures (with or 
without marriage as the result) owning to their “cultural and economic 
capital – the standards of consumption they could afford and the worlds 
of consumer pleasure they could introduce to China’s incipient nightlife 
scenes” (Farrer, 2010: 80). What government officials have is basically 
political power, the so-called “political capital”. However, by trading their 
power for money, government officials can convert their political capital 
into tangible economic capital and hence become a competitive buyer of 
sexual pleasure on the sex market.
Mistress culture among government officials thus does not only 
stand for moral erosion, free love or decedent life style; it is also an un-
doubted indicator of corruption due to the  inseparableness of money 
and sex in these kinds of relations. For without money, besides a salary, 
floating into their pockets, governmental officials would hardly be able 
to provide luxurious houses, apartments and other high-class consump-
tion goods for their mistresses and hence would be unable to keep them. 
The link between corruption and mistresses, however, can be related to 
the problem of which came first, the chicken or the egg. In some cases, it 
is the desire to possess young beauties that drives dishonest officials into 
cash-hunting so as to enhance their affordability. In other cases, dishon-
est officials install a mistress or several mistresses outside home as a way 
to consume the money they have illegitimately collected. Sometimes, it 
can be both. Besides, government officials, as the recent case against Yi 
Junqing has indicated, also demand and take bribes in forms of both sex-
ual intercourse and money from young women in exchange for the favor 
or protection they can provide with the power invested in their hands.
In leaning against a powerful or rich man and becoming his mistress, 
young women today played a role in the ecological chain of corruption, 
with or without being directly involved in the corruption enterprise of 
their male patronage. A glimpse into the  latest major corruption cases 
portrays a threefold picture of mistress as their role in corruption is con-
cerned. Firstly, some of these women trade intimacy or sex for money 
and material goods. They enter into a kind of “sexual contract” with gov-
ernment officials and by virtue of this sexual relationship they are able 
to retrieve large amounts of cash as well as other material goods ranging 
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from houses, cars, jewelries to memberships at luxury clubs and holi-
day resorts. They may be typically characterized as “gold-diggers”, and 
their role in the ecological chain of corruption is mainly to absorb and 
consume the money dishonest officials have embezzled or collected ille-
gally. Secondly, some mistresses are far more ambitious. By entering into 
a “sexual contract” with government officials, they are seeking not only 
material goods but also favor and protection in order to advance their 
own interests and expand their influences. They may be characterized as 
“power-utilizes” (on top of “gold-diggers”), and their role in the ecologi-
cal chain of corruption is to absorb and consume the money dishonest 
officials have embezzled or collected illegally and to solicit preferential 
treatment, often circumventing laws and normative administrative proce-
dures. Some of these women have relations with a number of government 
officials. They have knitted a huge ‘guanxi’ net around themselves and 
are often the pivot of reciprocity and power-favor exchange in this ‘guanxi’ 
net. Lastly, some mistress become partners of corrupt officials and playa 
direct role in corruption. They either render moral support or practical 
assistance to illegal money-hunting activity of their male lovers or col-
laborate with their patronage in taking bribes and misusing public funds.
The participation of in corruption as wives, mothers 
and daughters (or other family members)
Corruption in present-day China is not merely an isolated individual 
act. Chinese officials “are committed to their family and other members 
of their social networks” (Kwong, 1997: 88). In order to look after their 
loved ones, dishonest officials “used their influence and broke adminis-
trative rules and even laws” (ibid.). Very often, corruption activities were 
conducted jointly by male officials, as the main actor, and their spouses. 
Husband-wife solidarity and cooperation characterizes almost all the ma-
jor corruption cases being disclosed recently. The embroilment of wives 
in corruption is manifested by  a  public saying, which states that “be-
hind every corrupt male official there stands a corrupt wife”. Typically, 
the wives of government officials get involved in the following ways. First-
ly, they help others, say lesser officials and entrepreneurs, to access their 
powerful husbands and then demand money in return for the help they 
have provided. Secondly, they encourage their husbands to take bribes 
in order to increase the welfare of their family or children. Thirdly, they 
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store and manage the money their husbands have illegitimately collect-
ed. Fourthly, they exploit the employees of their husbands by squeezing 
money and expensive gifts out of them. Very often, a couple works closely 
as a team. The husband stages himself as a “clean” and “honest” public 
servant, whereas the wife receives money and gifts behind the curtains. In 
some cases, dishonest officials need the assistance of their wives for tac-
tical reasons. For it would be more convenient and safer to let wives take 
bribes than to do it by themselves.
Over the last five years, a number of wives were convicted for corrup-
tion together with their husbands. A sensational example is Zhang Yafei, 
wife of Ma Xiangdong, former Executive Deputy Mayor of Shenyang who 
was executed in 2001 for corruption crimes.1 From 1998, the year he be-
came Executive Deputy Mayor of Shenyang, to the day he was charged for 
corruption, Ma received bribes of up to 30,000,000 Yuan. About 68% of 
the bribe money was accumulated with the help of Zhang Yafei. In the be-
ginning Zhang merely administered the  money for her husband. Later 
on, she began to fish for money by herself. As the wife of a powerful man, 
Zhang used to receive a  considerable amount of visitors at home. Her 
motto was “don’t bother to come without brining something to me”. After 
Ma was jailed in a secret place, Zhang bribed a number of officials and 
judicial workers for information about her husband. Altogether eight peo-
ple were put into prison for having taken bribes from Zhang. In the end, 
Zhang herself was arrested and put into prison. Another convicted wife is 
Han Guirong, wife of Wang Huaizhong, former Vice Governor of Anhui 
Province. She received ten years in prison for her implication in corrup-
tion.
Recent Chinese blogs “accused a twenty something daughter of a for-
mer housing official in Zhengzhou, capital of central Henan Province, 
of owning 11 flats”. Furthermore, her “27-year-old brother may own as 
many as 14” flats. The “family is under investigation” (Kaiman, 2013). 
Since 2007, a new term “luo guan 裸官” (naked official) has come into 
popular usage in China to refer to those government officials who have 
sent their family abroad for permanent residence in a foreign country. Very 
often, these officials were those who have collected a huge fortune through 
various forms of corruption, and by sending their family abroad they also 
1 Ma was executed in Jiangsu Province on 10th October, 2001. He is the first person in 
China who was executed by giving an injection. For more about Ma, see news.tom.
con/Archive/1002/2003/1/8–36878.html.
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transferred the  fortune to a  safer place beyond the  reach of China. Ac-
cording to Chinese Internet sources, “naked officials” tend to be greedier 
and more vicious in money hunting as they have nothing to worry about 
or even lose. A large number of them have fled China to join their family 
abroad just before they were caught for corruption. Family and family 
members of corrupt officials, to this extent, have benefited enormously 
from the corruption economy and have become newly rich thanks to a bed 
of corruption. Professor Zu Lijia from the National Administration Col-
lege estimates that China, as of 2013, has about 1.18 million “naked offi-
cials”, who range from leaders in government administrative institutions, 
local government officials to leaders of many state-owned enterprises.
Conclusions
In this paper we looked into the  participation and involvement of 
women in corruption scandals, as government officials, as wives, daugh-
ters and mistresses of corrupt male officials, and we discussed the rele-
vance of gender in corruption in the Chinese context. Our study aims to 
fill the gap between fanfare media exposure and the description of women 
in or behind corruption and the absence of gender and its relevance in 
academic research regarding corruption in China so far. Due to the lack 
of a systematic and gender divided corruption statistics from China, we 
do not pursue a statistic tendency of corruption among men and wom-
en, nor a comparison between them. The general feeling is that far more 
male officials than female officials were caught for corruption, though this 
might have to do with male dominance in political power and government 
positions. While the question of which sex (in China) is “cleaner and fair-
er” than the other has to be put aside and await for further evidence and 
investigation, this study observed no distinct gender-based difference in 
corruption behavior. The major corruption cases involving a female offi-
cial share the same characteristics of corruption cases committed by male 
officials. It seems that when corruption has become deeply rooted and 
widespread as it is in reform China and when power-money exchange has 
become a “normative” rule of game, government officials grab the chance 
to get rich regardless of gender. The relatively small number of women 
involved in corruption may not necessarily imply that women are cleaner 
than men but rather indicate the minority status of women in politics.
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On the other hand, however, corruption is indeed a gendered prob-
lem in Chinese society given the reconfiguration of gender relations on 
a market premise and the extremely uneven distribution of political and 
economic resources along the gender line. Male officials not only domi-
nate the political and government positions, but also make a huge fortune 
by engaging in corruption activities. The concentration of mighty political 
and economic resources in the hands of the male power holder constitutes 
a  sharp contrast to the  general disadvantageous position of women on 
the labor market. Additionally, the participation of women in corruption 
as family members and mistresses of male officials might be seen as an 
active choice of these individuals to have a share in the growing nation-
al wealth. By aligning themselves with powerful and rich (often corrupt) 
male officials, women not only contract great economic benefit but also 
help to sustain the ecological chain of corruption by consuming the mon-
ey corrupt officials have collected. Mistress culture as contracted sexual 
relations are rooted deep in Chinese history, whereas the modern version 
of mistress culture is rested upon the political capital and economic “buy-
ing power” of male officials and the utilization of their “sexual capital” 
(or erotic capital) by young women for material goods and personal favors. 
However, by  saying corruption is a  gendered problem we do  not mean 
the fixed gender role with powerful and rich male government officials on 
the one hand and young, beautiful and money-thirsty women on the oth-
er. There are some cases from China showing young, handsome males 
who offer sexual pleasure to powerful female officials. The exchange be-
tween sex and money perseveres and characterizes all corruption cases, 
however, the place of gender can be switched and become the other way 
around.
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